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Forrest Frederick Bishop

Special Appearance Only

POB 30121, Seattle, Washington, 98113

Re: WA STATE v. F. BISHOP and similar January 3^rd, 2005

Cause #0534232 and similar

Forrest Frederick Bishop says:

The alleged general¹ appearance order for January 5^th, 2005, autographed without prejudice and while under duress, is null and void. There was no benefit conferred; invitobeneficium non datur. The court, and any court, does not have personal jurisdiction, nor subject matter jurisdiction, in the alleged cause, nunc pro tunc for the following reasons, inter alia:

This is fundamental. None of the ladies and gentlemen who have chosen to involve themselves in this matter informed myself of this omission. Some of the details of this non-service of Process are already testified to in Document #1020 [AMN], as well as in Document #4001 [DBP]. Violations of due process voids court orders as well as judgments, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938); Pure Oil Co. v. City of Northlake, 10 Ill.2d 241, 245, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1956); Hallberg v. Goldblatt Bros., 363 Ill 25 (1936). At this time of writing I have not even seen the alleged summons.

Judgment is void when proper notice is not given to all parties by the movant, Wilson v. Moore, 13 Ill.App.3d 632, 301 N.E.2d 39 (1st Dist. 1973), or where service of process was not made pursuant to statute and Supreme Court Rules, Janove v. Bacon, 6 Ill.2d 245, 249, 218 N.E.2d 706, 708 (1955). "Proper service of the summons and complaint is essential to invoke personal jurisdiction over a party, and a default judgment entered without proper jurisdiction is void." Markowski, 50 Wash. App. at 635-36; see also Mid-City Materials. Inc. v. Heater Beaters Custom Fireplaces, 36 Wash. App. 480, 486, 674 P.2d 1271 (1984). When want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible, Bradley v. Fisher 80 U.S. 335 (1871), 352; Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, (5^th Cir. 1980).

A trial court has no discretion when faced with a void judgment, and must vacate the judgment "whenever the lack of jurisdiction comes to light." Mitchell v. Kitsap County, 59 Wash. App. 177, 180-81, 797 P.2d 516 (1990). Whenever is now.

This fact alone suffices to make a nullity as well as a voidity out of everything else that has followed. In the event someone cares to take exception to this, I am including a few other reasons herein, for permanent lack of subject matter jurisdiction, infra.

(2) Fraud Upon the Court In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.3d 393 (1962)

(a) Unsubstantiated alleged drug use charge. Zero evidence has been offered, and zero argument has been made for this. Making up such accusations demonstrates legal incompetency in addition to the grotesque immorality of this clear and present tort. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." (Exodus 20:16).

(b) Bringing alleged charge in fictitious name. The un-rebutted Document #1800 [ADCE], Affidavit of Denial of Corporate Existence, establishes the fact that the alleged Plaintiff does not exist. I have discussed this with Mr. Ben Santos, who then willfully proceeded with full knowledge, and has offered zero proof of authority. The alleged Prosecutors appear to be in contempt of court and in default for this and other. If someone walks up to me on the street and claims to be Jesus Christ Incarnate, I am under no obligation to believe him. Neither are you.

Per rerum naturam factum negantis nulla probatio est: "A man must assign a good reason for coming (to the court). If the fact is denied, upon which he grounds his right to come (into the court), he must prove it. He, therefore, is the actor in the proof, and, consequently, he has no right, where the point is contested, to throw the onus probandi on the defendant." Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. 330.

(c) Undisclosed conflicts of interest. (cites omitted)

In addition to other deprivations, the conduct (Document #1201 [AJM]) of the Honorable Douglas Smith, on November 24^th, 2004, is also sufficient cause to void as retort. "Judges should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses. lawyers and others…" (Canon 3(A)(3) of CJC in WCR, West, 2004, p31). "[N]ot every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse." Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962). The judicial commission (RCW 2.64.010 (3)) may find this of interest.

CR 60(b)(4) and CrR 7.8(b)(3) provide relief from judgement or order procured through "[f]raud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Of course, a void judgment is also unenforceable. CR 60(b)(5), CrR 7.8(b)(4). CR 60(b)(11) and CrR 7.8(5) also contain provisions which permit the court to vacate a judgment for "[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.", such as contained herein. (WCR, West, 2004, p359, p419).

"[W]hen a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal constitution, he comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.", in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974). "[I]f the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers.", in Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870).

For information in general, and in the light of other testimony or allegations referenced and herein, "Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States,...shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon,... [etc.]" (18 U.S.C. § 241).

"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; They shall be fined ...[etc.] (18 U.S.C., § 242). "[C]ustom", or usage, appears to cover Court Rules as well, for your information.

The alleged plea entered is facially void, which has been acquiesced to, or tacitly admitted to be as such, by both Mr. Ben Santos and the Honorable Douglas Smith, as shown in what remains of the record (see item (6)(d) infra).

More than ten (10) days have passed, without any response to my Demand for Bill of Particulars (Doc #4001 [DBP]). The court is requested to take judicial notice that "Silence can only be equated with fraud when there is a legal and moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading…" U.S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d. 1021; U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F. 2d. 297, 299, 300 (1977). This is also a condition of default.

The requests for the Bill of Particulars are not groundless: the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation entitles the defendant to insist that the indictment apprise him of the crime charged with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense and protect himself after judgment against another prosecution on the same charge. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544, 558 (1876); United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360 (1878); Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427 (1913); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).

The right to notice of accusation is so fundamental a part of procedural due process that

the States are required to observe it. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948); Cole v.

Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).

Additionally, I have not been informed as to whether the alleged cause was brought under the long-discredited, crank theories of Plato, Justinian, Rousseau, Hobbes, Comte, Hegel, Karl Marx, John Dewey, John Maynard Keynes, H. G. Wells, "Colonel" House, Leo Strauss, Authur Corbin, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Felix Frankfurter, and the like.

Now, I have also not been informed as to whether the alleged cause is proceeding in maritime, law, equity, or something else (?), or whether there is an alleged tort or contract in effect. In any case, "No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence." Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

As the proceedings appeared to be transitioning from one form to another, in a sort of quantum superposition of actions, as testified to in Document #1020 [AMN], there is a further question of the cognizance of the qui tam cause under these various apparent judicial quasi-forms. For example, one does not have a trial by jury in maritime or admiralty, in rem or otherwise, nor a make-believe injured party in law, nor a valid contract, in absentia, excluding tort.

Additionally, I have not been informed as to whether the assertion of "(1) A person is guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug …" in RCW 46.61.502 is designed to convert the evidence (see #0911 [NCOLE]) to make the alleged cause an alleged "commercial crime" cognizable under the Uniform Commercial Code (West, UCC, 2004) and under 27 C.F.R. 72.11, which states in part: "Commercial Crimes: Any of the following …[Federal or State]: burglary, counterfeiting… swindling… compounding any of the foregoing crimes. Addiction to narcotic drugs and use of marihuana will be treated as if such were commercial crimes." -which then of course requires an unclouded contract in evidence.

I have also not been informed, inter alia, as to whether the superset "any drug" is inclusive of the set of "narcotic drugs", as to whether the alleged cause was therefore occasionally proceeding in admiralty, as "vehicles and persons…engaged in transporting passengers or merchandise [i.e. driving] …extend[s] to contracts made on land…if the power of regulating commerce can be made the foundation of…a new and extended admiralty jurisdiction beyond its heretofore known and admitted limits" (Propeller Genessee Chief et al. v. Fitzhugh et al., 12 How. 443 (U.S., 1851)), as to whether this old case ‘trampled out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored’ and is the direct ancestor of the despotic, alleged Dept. of Motor Vehicles as well as the criminally-insane "War on Drugs", inter alia, nor as to whether the line of reasoning traced out supra has the correct range and bearing for a direct hit on the powder magazine of the good ship Admiralty Inland. Q.e.d.

I did not waive my alleged right to Assistance of Counsel at any time. No such insulating Assistance has been available, nor did I "represent" myself (Document #1030[ADPS]). For example, on November 24^th, 2004 at approximately 3:47 PM, an alleged public defender was unwilling to contract to undivided Counsel and to preserve my rights under law. (cites omitted).

(a) The various alleged statutes, canons, etc., provide such a variegated, target-rich environment of color-of-law, Due-Process violations, that they are too numerous list here. Parts of the uniform tenor of this long train of repeated injuries and usurpations are examined in Document #0911 [NCOLE].

(b) Judicial Prejudice. Mixing judicial and prosecutorial functions appears to make the Judge an involuntary (?) alleged Party to the alleged action. This public manifestation of invidious discrimination-

…(4)…(b) For purposes of this section, "prima facie evidence" is evidence of sufficient circumstances that would support a logical and reasonable inference of the facts sought to be proved. In assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of the foundational facts, the court or administrative tribunal is to assume the truth of the prosecution's or department's evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to the prosecution or department….

-is such an egregious trespass upon Due Process (aka Law of the Land) that it stands all by itself as cause to void judgement on every DUI case ever tried under its alleged authority. Even the Law of the Sea (Admiralty and Maritime) would find this witch-hunting, Star-Chamber prejudice repugnant. "Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.", Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 61,62.

"...it is hard to see how a statutory rebuttable presumption is turned from a rule of

evidence or of substantive law as the result of the later statute making it conclusive. In

both cases it is a substitute for proof; in the one, open to challenge and disproof, and in

the other conclusive. However, whether the latter presumption be treated as a rule of

into existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made, to exist in actuality,

and the result is the same..." This court has held more than once that a statute creating

a presumption which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut violates the due process

clause of the [Fifth and] Fourteenth Amendment. For example, a constitutional prohibition cannot be transgressed indirectly by the creation of a statutory presumption any more than it can be violated by a direct enactment. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, (1932) (emphasis added).

A judge’s private, prior agreement to decide in favor of one party is not a judicial act. Although a party conniving with a judge to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding may deal with him in his "judicial capacity," the other party’s expectation of judicial impartiality is actively frustrated by the scheme. It is the antithesis of the "principled and fearless decision-making" that judicial immunity exists to protect. Rankin v. Howard, 633 F.2d 844 (9^th Cir. 1980) cert. Denied, 451 U.S. 939, 101 S. Ct. 2020, (1981), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967), Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229 (7^th Cir. 1980). and Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9^th Cir. 1974).

"If any question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against him, this is not due process of law…"–Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition, page 449.

The court is requested to take judicial notice: that "The Constitution of these United States is the supreme law of the land. Any law that is repugnant to the Constitution is null and void of law." Marbury v. Madison, 5 US 137. "An unconstitutional act is not law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.", Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425. And furthermore: "The court is to protect against any encroachment of Constitutionally secured liberties.", Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, so

ask not where the buck stops. "The Judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge’s other activities…" (Judicial Canon 3, quoted in The Judge’s Book, p390), which is watered down to "The Judicial duties of a judge should take precedence over all the judge’s other activities…" in the alleged WCR, CJC (WCR, West, 2004, p 31). And if you contemplate the common defense "Oh, I’m not really a lawful Judge, I just play one in court", please restate your assumptions.

The court is requested to take judicial notice: That the apparent public manifestation of invidious discrimination outlined in this Section 6(b) applies to any and all Judges, or other alleged Officers of the court who may wish to proceed with this null-cause or like. "Moreover, public manifestation by a judge of the judge’s knowing approval of invidious discrimination on any basis gives the appearance of impropriety under Canon 2 and diminishes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Section 2A.", (The Judge’s Book, p390, emphasis added). "Judges shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice." Canon 3 (A)(5), CJC (WCR, West, 2004, p32, emphasis added, also see comment therein).

The MIA (see #0911 [NCOLE]) Preamble: "THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence…" (US Constitution.), is probably where the phrase "public confidence" comes from, for your notice.

(c) Moral turpitude and malicious prosecution: Document #0911 [NCOLE], which highlights the immediate above in addition to many other trespasses upon due process, has been in the alleged Prosecutor’s possession since November 19^th, 2004, and the arguments therein remain unrebutted. Each of those arguments taken singly is reason for void order and void judgement.

Misprision may also be deemed to be moral turpitude: "Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined... 18 U.S.C. § 4, hence the service of Document #0911 [NCOLE], as testified to in Document #1911[ANCOLE]. See also CJC Canon 3 (C)(1).

(d) Loss of record. The alleged hearing in Courtroom 1 of November 24^th, 2004, is incomplete. There was an additional 16 minutes or so between about 3:42 PM and about 3:58 PM that was not on the court-supplied audio CD. Instead, it cuts off about two minutes into this hearing, which was conducted after clearing the room of public witnesses, as testified to in Document #1201 [AJM]. I anticipated that the court might be "experiencing technical difficulties" that day, before I even went in the door. CR 60 (a) and CrR 7.8 (a), both titled RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER, provide "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record…arising from…omission may be corrected by the court…or on the motion of any party…as the court orders" (WCR, 2004, p359, p419). In lieu of Writ of Error, I request the court provide the entire record of the alleged hearing of November 24^th, 2004.

(e) I have not invoked the most critical, US Constitution (MIA the Washington Constitution), Article 1, §8 and §10 violations. The compelled trafficking in private bills of exchange and/or private, alleged promissory notes may be proof alone of the unconstitutionality of the cause, and of its corporate, commercial nature: STATE OF WASHINGTON and Washington State are not the same alleged creatures. This ongoing, nationwide, pattern of racketeering activity alone is sufficient to overturn the basis of, and quite possibly destroy, our civilization, as noted elsewhere by many others. This process has occurred with remarkable rapidity, and appears to be in the terminal stages. From this perspective, the Homeland Security Period of American history is seen as the usual, pre-collapse, rear-guard action. I call it "Quad-Speed Rome". The court is requested to take judicial notice: the laws of nature are constant.

(a) I am not in possession of any document showing a statutory requirement for "representation" by some private-club agent, as has been insisted upon by a number of men and women involved in this matter and elsewhere. To the contrary, I am in possession of an electronic copy thereof a document claiming that Assistance of Counsel is mandatory. Judgment is void if the court exceeded its statutory authority, Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 278 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

(b) The admonition to the effect that "those without representation will be treated the same as if they were attorneys" has been shown in Document #4001[AJM], other incidents not yet brought to light, and herein, to be not quite correct. I doubt very seriously that alleged Bar members are extended this kind of treatment.

(c) See additional in Document #0911 [NCOLE], which is referenced as if included herein.

I have made a number of due diligence, good-faith attempts to locate the oaths of office of the Honorable Arthur R. Chapman, the Honorable Douglas Smith, and Elizabeth Monroe (?) (alleged Judge pro tem on December 2^nd, 2004). Nobody seems to know where these are, which is not to say they do not exist. The Honorable Douglas Smith did appear to recollect swearing an oath, though he didn’t know where it was on public file. I have reason to believe that Elizabeth Monroe did not even take an oath, and had no business being at the bench that day (Shoreline Courtroom 2, December 2^nd, 2004).

The alleged Washington [State] Court Rules (WCR, West, 2004) describe elaborate oaths for alleged attorneys, and whole pages of stuff on how to extract confessions from alleged criminals, but nothing in the Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) about a Judge’s Oath! As an aside, I am not in possession of any documentation regarding the legality of anything asserted within these Court Rules. I request the court release unto me, by return mail, proof of these oaths of office and delgated orders of permission.

The apparently make-believe "Plaintiff" has naturally failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (F.R.C.P. 12(6)(b)). Jurisdiction cannot be held where a complaint states no cognizable cause of action against that alleged Party, Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill.App.3d 441, 618 N.E. 2d 554 (1st Dist 1993). No corpus delecti was in evidence for a tort case in, at, or roundabout law, nor has any valid contract, expressed, implied, chanted, quasied, or otherwise conjured, been offered into proof for any other form(s) of action. The above will be subpoenaed if any collateral litigation is required.

Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 U.S. 330
McNally v. U.S., 483 U.S. 350, 371-372, Quoting U.S. v Holzer, 816 F.2d. 304, 307